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Welfare-reducing  Speculation 
Jeremy C. Stein 
Harvard University 
Introducing  more  speculators  into the market for a given commod- 
ity leads to improved  risk sharing  but can also change  the informa- 
tional content  of  prices.  This  inflicts an externality  on those  traders 
already  in  the  market,  whose  ability  to  make  inferences  based  on 
current  prices will be affected.  In some cases, the externality  is nega- 
tive: the  entry  of  new  speculators  lowers  the informativeness  of the 
price to existing  traders. The  net result can be one of price destabili- 
zation  and  welfare  reduction.  This  is true even  when  all agents  are 
rational,  risk-averse,  competitors  who  make the best possible  use of 
their available information. 
I.  Introduction 
For  years,  economists  have  debated  the  merits  of  speculative  behav- 
ior.  Milton  Friedman  set  the  tone  for  the  debate  when  he  claimed: 
"People  who  argue  that  speculation  can  be  destabilizing  seldom 
realize  that  this  is  largely  equivalent  to  saying  that  speculators  lose 
money,  since  speculation  can  be  destabilizing  in  general  only  if 
speculators  sell  when  the  currency  is low  in  price  and  buy  when  it  is 
high"  (1953,  p.  175).  In  other  words,  rational  speculators  should  exert 
a stabilizing  influence  by bidding  up  low  prices  and  selling  off  at high 
prices. 
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nors of  the  Federal  Reserve  is gratefully  acknowledged.  Thanks  also to Arnold  Kling, 
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seminar  participants  at the  Board  of  Governors,  MIT,  and  Harvard  for  their  com- 
ments. 
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Friedman's  claim drew  a flurry of counterexamples.  The  more  re- 
cent of these,  such as Salant (1984)  and Hart and Kreps (1986),  dem- 
onstrate  that, even  in a general  equilibrium  framework  with optimiz- 
ing speculators,  prices can be destabilized.  However,  these  examples 
also point up a serious  flaw in the whole  destabilization  literature: the 
fact  that,  for  arbitrary  preferences,  price  stability  need  not  corre- 
spond  closely  to any measure  of consumer  or social welfare.  Indeed, 
the examples  of Hart and Kreps and Salant rely on consumer  prefer- 
ences  that  change  over  time,  so  speculation  that  destabilizes  prices 
actually improves  consumer  welfare.  This  is an expected  result since 
both papers compare  a regime  with speculation  with a regime  with no 
speculation.  As Salant notes,  a simple  gains-from-trade  argument  en- 
sures that consumers  will always be better off  when  they are allowed 
to trade with speculators  than  when  they do  not have this option. 
Unfortunately,  the  question  whether  some  speculation  is  better 
than none  is probably not a very relevant  one.  In terms of real-world 
policy-making,  it seems  more  interesting  to ask: "Is more speculation 
better  than  less?" Gains-from-trade  arguments  offer  no  help  here. 
Yet  one  of  the  most  important  implications  of  the  stabilization- 
destabilization  debate  concerns  the  desirability  of  opening  futures 
or  options  markets.  Such  markets  can  be  thought  of  as  a  conduit 
through  which  a greater  number  of  speculators  can flow into  an al- 
ready  existing  spot  market.  Regulators  have  frequently  expressed 
concern  that  futures  and  options  markets  can  be price  destabilizing 
and welfare  reducing,  and they have considered  measures  to address 
these  problems.  Theoretical  economists,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
tended  to  follow  the  spirit of  Friedman.  Both  Danthine  (1978)  and 
Turnovsky  (1983)  present  models  in which  futures  markets are seen 
as a stabilizing  influence. 
This  paper  demonstrates  how  introducing  a new  group  of  spec- 
ulators  into  the  spot  market  for  a commodity  (corresponding  to the 
opening  of  a futures  or  options  market)  can  destabilize  prices.  The 
model does not rely on any shifts in consumer  preferences.  Consumer 
utility functions  are  very  simple  and  time  symmetric.  Consequently, 
price  stability and  welfare  are closely  related:  in the  examples  to be 
seen  here,  stabler  prices  will be associated  with higher  levels  of  wel- 
fare,  and  price  destabilization  can be shown  to be welfare  reducing. 
The  model  presented  here  focuses  on  two  aspects  of  specula- 
tive  behavior,  risk sharing  and  information  transmission.  The  risk- 
sharing  benefit  of  increased  speculation  is well  recognized.  All  else 
being  equal,  the introduction  of  new  agents  into  a system lowers  the 
aggregate  risk aversion,  thereby  strengthening  the  arbitrage  forces 
that lead to the stabilization  of  prices.  For example,  the opening  of a 
futures  market allows risk-averse  producers  and inventory  holders  to INFORMATIONAL  EXTERNALITIES  1 125 
hedge  their  production  and  storage  decisions  by locking  in  a  sales 
price  with  short  futures  contracts.  This  hedging  (which  amounts  to 
unloading  some  of  their  risk onto  the  new  pool  of  people  that  the 
futures  market brings into the system) enables  them to respond  more 
strongly  to price  signals,  thereby  reducing  price variability. 
A less frequently  noted  aspect of the speculation  problem  concerns 
the  information  that  is communicated  by market  prices.  In  spite  of 
the  rapid  development  of  a vast literature  on  information  in  prices 
(Grossman  [1976,  1977,  1978],  Grossman  and  Stiglitz  [1980],  and 
Hellwig  [1980]  are a few examples),  even  the more  recent  papers  on 
the  intertemporal  price  stability properties  of  speculation  (i.e.,  Hart 
and Kreps, Salant, and Turnovsky)  have tended  to ignore  the issue of 
heterogeneous  information  among  market  participants.' 
In the model  of this paper,  information  is of crucial importance.  In 
addition  to  providing  increased  risk  sharing,  new  speculators  with 
private information  can change  the  informational  content  of  prices. 
In some  cases,  this inflicts  a negative  externality  on  those  people  al- 
ready  in  the  market:  their  ability to  make  inferences  from  prices  is 
impaired.  If this "misinformation"  effect  is strong  enough  relative to 
the  need  for  additional  risk  sharing,  welfare  losses  can  result.  It 
should  be  emphasized  that  the  misinformation  does  not  arise  from 
any irrationality on the part of the new speculators.  They  are rational 
profit-maximizing  competitors  who  make  the  best  possible  use  of 
their available information. 
For concreteness,  the  paper  discusses  increased  speculation  in the 
context  of a particular example:  the opening  of a futures  market for a 
perfectly  storable commodity.  This example  encompasses  a variety of 
markets in which the desirability of futures  trading has been debated: 
those  for  certain  agricultural  products,  as well  as for  stocks,  bonds, 
currencies,  gold,  and  silver.  Furthermore,  it will be argued  that the 
welfare  effects  of  opening  options  markets  can  be  analyzed  in  the 
same  framework. 
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  II details the basic struc- 
ture  and  assumptions  of  the  model.  Included  in  this  section  is  an 
analysis of  the welfare  properties  of  speculative  regimes,  as well as a 
formal  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  opening  a futures  market  is 
exactly  equivalent  to allowing  more  speculators  to participate  in the 
' One  exception  is Danthine  (1978),  where  futures  markets  are  seen  as stabilizing 
because  they allow producers  to learn more  about the state of the world (by looking  at 
the futures  price) than they otherwise  would.  However,  Danthine's  model  is somewhat 
"rigged"  in  favor  of  stability  since  he  assumes  that  futures  market  participants  are 
strictly better  informed  than the  producers  of the commodity.  The  motivation  behind 
such an assumption  is unclear:  as will be shown here,  it is not needed  to ensure  that the 
futures  market  players  earn  a profit  and  hence  stay in business. 1126  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
spot  market.  Section  III  examines  the  price  stability and  welfare  ef- 
fects of futures  market trading  under  three  different  sets of assump- 
tions concerning  the distribution  of information  in the economy.  Sec- 
tion  IV summarizes  and  offers  some  conclusions. 
II.  The  Model 
A.  Consumers 
In  this  two-period  model,  consumers  are  assumed  to  derive  utility 
from  two  sources:  consumption  of  both  the  commodity  in question 
(call it wheat)  and  a "background" or numeraire  good,  which can be 
taken to represent  all other goods.  If we denote  first-period  consump- 
tion  of  wheat  by  C1, second-period  wheat  consumption  by C2, and 
total two-period  consumption  of the numeraire  good  by N, aggregate 
consumer  utility is assumed  to be given  by 
c2  c2 
U(C1,  C2, N)  = DC1  + DC  2+N  (1) 
2  2 
That  is,  utility  is concave  in  C1 and  C2 but  linear  in  the  numeraire 
good.  This  Marshallian utility function  is popular  in the literature  on 
speculation,  mostly  because  it leads  to the  following  simple  demand 
curves  (see the  Appendix  for all derivations  not  given  in the text): 
C1 =  D  -  P1,  (2) 
C2  =  D-P2  (3) 
From now on, D will be taken  to be equal to zero.  This  normaliza- 
tion does  not affect  the analysis at all and  is just  used  to simplify  the 
notation  that is to follow.2 
Consumers  receive  a stochastic  endowment  of wheat in each of the 
two periods,  which  they are unable  to store directly.  The  shocks that 
buffet  the market are of two types,  transitory and permanent.  In the 
first period,  there  is a total  supply  shock  of  A  +  X, where  A is the 
permanent  component  (it will be present  in the second  period  as well) 
and X is the first-period  transitory component.  In the second  period, 
the total shock is A +  Y: the permanent  A shock plus the new second- 
period  transitory  shock,  given  by Y. The  three  shocks are assumed  to 
be independent  of  each other,  normally  distributed,  with zero  mean 
and  variances  of  va,  vx, and  vy, respectively.  One  might  think  of  the 
transitory  shocks  as being  caused  by passing  disruptions  such as bad 
2 The  interpretation  is that "consumption  demand"  really refers  to "deviation  from 
mean consumption  demand,"  and "price" really refers to "deviation from mean price." 
Working  with "demeaned"  variables  results  in a considerable  economy  of  notation. INFORMATIONAL  EXTERNALITIES  1 127 
weather  or  soil  conditions,  while  the  permanent  shocks  come  from 
more  lasting changes  such as decreases  in the number  of acres being 
farmed.  Given the assumptions  on supply, as well as the zero intercept 
demand  schedule,  it is easy to calculate  market-clearing  prices.  If the 
total inventory  held  in  period  1 is I and  this inventory  must  be  un- 
loaded  in period  2, prices  are given  by 
P1  =  -A  -X  +  I,  (4) 
P2  =  -A  -Y-I.  (5) 
As  these  equations  show,  the  objective  in  specifying  the  stochastic 
structure  above is to inject the  potential  for confusion  among  imper- 
fectly informed  speculators  who try to make inferences  from the first- 
period  price. There  is no point in holding  inventories  if prices are low 
because  of  an A  shock,  because  that  shock  will persist  through  the 
next  period,  keeping  prices  low  and  preventing  speculative  gain. 
However,  if prices are low because of a temporary X disturbance,  then 
it does  make  sense  to speculate,  because  that shock will be gone  next 
period  and  prices  will tend  to rise.  In what follows,  varying assump- 
tions  will  be  made  concerning  the  observability  of  the  shocks:  one 
group  will be able  to observe  the  transitory  shock  (they  are  farmers 
who  are  experts  on  soil  conditions,  e.g.)  while  another  group  may 
know  something  about  the  permanent  shock  (their  stockbroker  has 
some  statistics on  the  acreage  being  devoted  to wheat  farming). 
B.  Speculative  Demand  for Inventories and 
Futures Contracts 
Aside  from  the  consumers,  there  are two other  groups  in the  econ- 
omy.  They  consist  of  n1  "spot traders" and  n2  "secondary  traders." 
Spot  traders  are  assumed  to  be  able  to  store  inventories  costlessly.3 
Secondary  traders, on the other  hand,  do not have inventory  capabil- 
ity. The  only way that they can participate  in this economy  is through 
the use of futures  contracts.  If the commodity  in question  is wheat, we 
can think  of  the  spot  traders  as being  the  only  ones  who  own  grain 
silos.  In  a financial  setting,  the  spot  traders  can  represent  the  large 
institutions  that  can  easily  go  long  and  short  in cash  market  instru- 
ments,  while  the secondary  traders  are the smaller investors  that can 
take only  certain  positions-particularly  short  ones  or  highly  lever- 
aged  long  ones-through  the  use  of  financial  futures. 
Thus  in a world  without  futures  markets,  the only  players  are the 
spot  traders.  Introducing  futures  markets  includes  the  secondary 
3 Linear carrying  costs would  change  nothing  essential. 1128  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
traders  in the activity. Both  types  of  agents  are assumed  to have  the 
same constant absolute  risk aversion  utility functions:  U(FI)  -e 
where B is the coefficient  of risk aversion and 11  is profits.4 Consumers 
are  assumed  not  to  trade  in  the  futures  market.  This  may  appear 
restrictive  since  their  utility  is linear  in the  numeraire,  which  would 
lead  them  to  behave  as risk-neutral  speculators  if  they  could  trade. 
However,  we will always consider  those  cases in which the number  of 
secondary  traders,  n2,  goes  to  infinity,  thereby  making  that  group 
behave  in a risk-neutral  fashion.  If we just  assume  that the  informa- 
tion set of the consumers  is the same as that of the secondary  traders, 
there  is no loss of  generality  in ignoring  the  speculative  demands  of 
the consumers.5 
The  spot  traders'  information  set  will  be  denoted  by  f1i,  and 
for  shorthand,  E1( ) will  stand  for  E( /41 )  and  V1( ) will  stand  for 
var( /41 ). Similar notation  applies  for the secondary  traders' informa- 
tion set  f12  and  their  conditional  means  and  variances.  It is assumed 
that, in addition  to the market  price,  spot traders are able to observe 
the  transitory  shock X. Secondary  traders,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
some  information  about  the  permanent  shock  A,  although  this  in- 
formation  is imperfect.  Specifically,  secondary  traders  observe  Z  = 
A +  W, where W is another  independent  mean zero normal with vari- 
ance vw. 
It is easy to show that, in a world  without  futures,  the spot traders' 
demand  for  inventories  in the  first period  is given  by 
I  =  ki(E  P2  -  PI),  (6) 
where kI =  n  /[B VI  (P2)] and P1 and P2 are the spot prices in the first 
and  second  periods,  respectively. 
Once  futures  are  introduced,  costless  storage  and  a zero  interest 
rate imply that the  futures  price P1 must equal the current  spot price 
P1.6  Hence  in equilibrium,  the futures  price is informationally  redun- 
dant: it does not convey  any additional  information  above and beyond 
"Note that speculators  care only about consuming the numeraire  good; unlike con- 
sumers, they want wheat only for the possible trading gains it may net them. 
5This  claim  actually  involves somewhat  more than meets the eye. If'  consumers  were 
allowed to participate, we would have to account for the fact that, in addition to 
observing  the price and any private  signal, they can also observe  their own endowment. 
In order to make the results of the paper apply in this more complex case, the dimen- 
sionality  of the model would have to be raised so that consumers  with three sources  of' 
data  (PI,  a  noisy  private  signal,  and  their  initial  endowment)  could  still  face  some 
uncertainty.  For  example,  we  could  have  first-period  supply  equal  A  +  B  +  X and 
second-period  supply  equal A  +  (B/2)  +  Y. 
This  is a consequence  of inventory  arbitrage.  If', e.g.,  we had P1 <  PI, spot traders 
could buy wheat, store it, and deliver into a short futures  position  for a risk-free profit. INFORMATIONAL  EXTERNALITIES  1 129 
that  conveyed  by the  spot  price.7  Still,  one  should  not  take  this  to 
mean that futures  markets have no informational  role. The  introduc- 
tion  of  a  futures  market  can  change  the  equilibrium  spot  pricing 
function  so  that  spot  prices  will  reflect  information  different  from 
that in the absence  of  a futures  market. 
Spot traders' demand  for  futures  can be shown  to be 
F1 =  -It  +  kl(ElP2  -  Pf),  (7) 
where If-  is the inventory  the spot traders hold when  they are allowed 
to participate  in the  futures  market.  Equation  (7) is a separation  re- 
sult: one  can think  of  spot  traders  as hedging  their  inventories  per- 
fectly  with  the  -  contracts  and  then  adding  additional  contracts 
to the extent  that they want to take a risky position  and expect  prices 
to move  one  way or the  other. 
Secondary  traders,  on  the  other  hand,  have  no  inventories  to 
hedge.  Their  demand  for  futures  contracts  is given  by 
F2  =  k2(E2P2  -  P),  (8) 
where  k2 =  n2/[BV2(P2)].  Equations  (7) and  (8) allow us to state the 
following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  1.  In  the  presence  of  a  futures  market,  inventories 
held by spot traders are the same as those that would be held by both 
groups  combined  in a spot  market  economy  in which  both  had stor- 
age capability; that is, If  =  k1(EIP2  -  P1)  +  k2(E2P2  -  P). 
The  proposition  follows  immediately  from  the  futures  market- 
clearing condition  that F1 +  F2  =  0, combined  with the fact that P1  = 
P1. The  intuition  is that  even  though  secondary  traders  are  not  al- 
lowed  to buy inventories  directly,  with costless storage they pass their 
would-be  inventory  demands  directly  through  to spot traders via the 
futures  market. For example,  suppose  that secondary  traders are very 
optimistic  about  next  period's  price.  If  they  could  store  inventories, 
they would  do that. Instead  they try to buy futures  contracts.  Even if 
the  spot  traders  do  not  share  their  optimism,  they  will sell them  the 
contracts.  Having  sold  the  futures,  the  spot  traders  then  store  extra 
inventories  to  put  in  place  a perfect,  costless  hedge.  They  are at no 
risk since the extra  inventory  can be delivered  into the short  futures 
position.  In other  words,  high  futures  demand  by secondary  traders 
induces  the  spot  traders  to  buy  the  inventories  that  the  secondary 
traders themselves  would  have bought  if they had direct access to the 
spot market. 
7 This is in contrast to Grossman  (1  977)  and Danthine  (1978).  where convex  storage 
costs break the  equality  between  spot and  futures  prices. 1130  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
The  proposition  is useful  because  it allows a compact  mathematical 
treatment  of  the  addition  of  a futures  market.  There  is no  need  to 
explicitly  keep  track of  futures  prices  or holdings;  one  can  proceed 
simply by pretending  that the inventory  spot market has been opened 
to the secondary  traders.8 
A similar logic  would  apply  to the  opening  of  an options  market. 
Suppose  that there  are two groups  in the economy  and  that the first 
can  borrow  and  lend  costlessly  while  the  second  faces  credit  con- 
straints.  What  happens  if traders  in the  second  group  receive  some 
very bullish information  that makes them wish to take a large position 
in  the  asset  in  question?  Without  an  options  market,  they  will  be 
unable  to  borrow  enough  to  take  the  position  they  want.  With  an 
options  market, however,  they can control  many more shares by buy- 
ing calls. The  first group  can sell them  these  calls and then  execute  a 
costless  hedge  'a la  Black  and  Scholes  (1973)  by buying  shares  and 
borrowing  in the  right  proportions.  Once  again,  the secondary  mar- 
ket allows asset demands  to be transmitted  through  to the "big play- 
ers" who can deal  costlessly  in the  spot  market.9 
C.  Welfare Considerations 
Given  the  consumer  utility  function  above,  we  can  see  that  when 
inventories  are carried  from  one  period  to the  next  so as to stabilize 
prices (which is the same as stabilizing consumption  since P2  -P  = 
C1 -  C2), there are two effects  on consumer  welfare.  First, the concav- 
ity and time symmetry  of the function  in C1 and C2 imply a benefit  to 
8 A referee has pointed out that opening a futures market  is not exactly  like adding 
more spot traders  since in the former case the existing spot traders  are selling futures 
contracts  to and essentially  performing storage for the secondary  traders and, hence, 
may  be learning  something  about their private  information  (which  clearly  would not be 
true if the secondary  traders  could buy inventories  on their own). However,  it turns  out 
that no new information  is communicated  to spot traders,  either by their own futures 
positions  or by aggregate open interest data. This is because individual  futures posi- 
tions are indeterminate;  it is not true that each spot trader  will hold 1/n1  of the futures 
positions  and corresponding  extra inventory  and hence can deduce total extra inven- 
tory  due to secondary  traders.  All that is determined  is each spot trader's  net unhedged 
position.  Open interest  is similarly  meaningless:  even if secondary  trader  net demand is 
zero, it is possible  to have open interest in futures since some spot traders  can be long 
the contract and have smaller inventory holdings, while others are short and store 
more. 
9 There seems to be some confusion among finance  theorists  on this point. It is often 
claimed that "since  options are redundant, they do not change the equilibrium  asset 
prices."  This would hold true only if everybody  in the economy  could borrow  and lend 
costlessly  so that introducing  options changed nobody's  opportunity  set. But if this were 
the case, why would anybody trade in options at all? The Black-Scholes  formula still 
holds when only some agents can borrow and lend costlessly,  although asset prices 
cannot strictly  be taken as exogenous: opening an options market indirectly  changes 
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stability  since,  for  a  given  consumption  of  the  numeraire  good  N, 
consumers  would  prefer  to  consume  their  total  wheat  allotment  as 
smoothly  as possible: they would  like C1 as close to C2 as they can have 
it. Second,  inventory  activity affects the profits of the speculative  trad- 
ers, given by FI =  I(P2  -  PI),  with any such profits entailing a transfer 
of the numeraire  good N from the consumers  to the speculators.  This 
profit effect  can run either  way: profits first rise as inventory  activity 
rises from  zero  to a positive  level  but then  fall as prices are forced  to 
equality. Taking  the two effects  together,  we can write expected  con- 
sumer  surplus  as 
UC =  E(-  2i-  1 -  A)  (9) 
where  Uc  is  expected  consumer  welfare  and  11 is  the  total  profit 
earned  by the speculative  traders.  From the point of view of consum- 
ers  with  a fixed  endowment  of  wheat,  the  ideal  situation  is one  in 
which  P2  =  P1.  Not  only  is  their  wheat  consumption  perfectly 
smoothed,  but  their  consumption  of  the  numeraire  good  is  max- 
imized  since  speculative  profits  are zero. 
It  is  also  useful  to  examine  social  welfare,  which  entails  adding 
some  measure  of  speculators'  expected  utilities  to those  of  the  con- 
sumers.  Given  the  normality  assumptions,  each  speculator's  utility 
function  is equivalent  to 
B  U' =  E(H1) -  -  var(fl,),  (10) 
2 
where  U' and Hi are the utility and profit of the ith speculator.  This is 
perhaps  the  most  natural  utility  measure  to use  in constructing  the 
social  welfare  function  since  it  leads  to  an  equal  weighting  of  all 
groups'  expected  consumption  of  the  numeraire  good.'0  When  we 
sum over all the speculators  in both groups,  expected  social welfare  is 
given  by 
=  EL- 2  -2  2n,  V,(I,)  -  2n2  V2((H2)1  (11) 
where F1I  and 12  are the total profits of the first and second  groups  of 
traders.  The  expectation  of  total speculative  profits does  not appear 
in the expression  because  such profits just  represent  a transfer  of the 
numeraire  good  from  consumers  to traders,  which has no net effect 
on  social welfare." 
'O  This  weighting  is not,  however,  crucial to any of  the  main results obtained  here. 
"  For a more detailed  discussion  of the welfare benefits of price stability, see Samuel- 
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III.  Price  Variability  under  Different 
Informational  Scenarios 
In this section,  we examine  the effects  on price variability and welfare 
of opening  a futures  market.  Three  different  assumptions  are made 
concerning  the accuracy of secondary  traders' private information.  In 
subsection A, their information  is perfect:  their observation  error has 
variance vw  =  0 so that they  know the A shock exactly. Subsection  B 
considers  the opposite  extreme  where  vw is infinite  so that secondary 
traders  effectively  have  no  information  on  A and  must  use  market 
prices  as  their  only  data.  Finally,  subsection  C takes  up  the  more 
general  case in which  vw is neither  zero  nor  infinite. 
In each case, the  method  of analysis is essentially  the same.  First, a 
rational  expectations  equilibrium  (REE)  pricing  function  for  PI  is 
found  in terms  of  the  primitive  random  variables.  With the  equilib- 
rium PI in hand,  it is then an easy task to compute  (P2 -  PI) and find 
its variance.  It is also straightforward  to evaluate  the  consumer  and 
social welfare  measures  given  by (9) and  (11). 
A.  Secondary  Traders Observe  A Exactly 
This  is  the  simplest  of  the  three  cases.  The  first-period  price  will 
reflect  both  X  and  A.  Since  spot  traders  know  X,  they  can  infer  A 
exactly by looking  at the market price P1 . Similarly, secondary  traders 
who  know A can  infer  X exactly  from  the  price.  Thus  this case  be- 
haves exactly  as if both X and A were directly  observed  by everyone. 
The  only uncertainty  remaining  is the second-period  transitory shock 
Y: as a result of this residual  risk, inventory  demand  is still downward 
sloping  with respect  to PI .  2 
First, we can derive  the equilibrium  without  futures  markets,  with 
only  spot  traders  participating.  Assume  that the  first-period  price  is 
given  by 
P1  =  oA  +  OX,  (12) 
with (x and  3 undetermined.  Using  (4) and  (5), we can find 
I=  ((  + 1)A  +  (a  + 1)X,  (13) 
P2  -  P  =  -(2(X  +  2)A  -  (213 +  1)X -  Y.  (14) 
Given  the  information  structure  posited,  spot  traders  can  predict 
the A and X components  of  (P2 -  PI)  perfectly.  Only Y is unknown. 
12 Nothing  is changed  if both  groups  observe  A or both observe  X. INFORMATIONAL  EXTERNALITIES  1133 
Therefore, 
EI(P2  -  P1)  =  -(2(x  +  2)A  -  (213 +  1)X,  (15) 
VI(P2)  =  vy  sothat k  -  i  (16) 
Bv,' 
We  can  solve  for  (x and  3 by  setting  the  inventory  in  (13)  equal  to 
inventory  demand,  which is kl times the expected  price change  given 
in (15).  This  procedure  yields  the  following  REE solution: 
t  -11=  1  +  2k  or 
X(1  +  kj)  (17) 
PI  =  -A-  1+2k, 
This  implies 
P2  -  P1 =  -Y  +  1 +  2k1'  (18) 
var(P2  PI)  Vy  (1  +  2k1)2  (19) 
From (19), it is clear that speculative  behavior  is more  stabilizing as 
(1) the  number  of  spot  traders,  ni,  increases,  (2) the  risk aversion  B 
decreases,  or  (3)  the  second-period  transitory  shock  Y becomes  less 
variable. All three  of these  effects  serve to increase  kI, in which price 
variability is monotonically  declining.  It is also easy to check  (see the 
Appendix  for  details)  that  both  consumer  and  social  welfare  are 
monotonically  increasing  in kj: when  kl goes  to infinity,  not only  are 
prices  and  consumption  as well  smoothed  as possible,  but  expected 
speculative  profits are forced  to zero, as are the variance terms in (1 1). 
Adding  a  futures  market  in  this  case  is  trivial.  Since  secondary 
traders have exactly the same information  as spot traders, all a futures 
market does  is shift the inventory  demand  function  by a factor of  (n1 
+  n2)/nI.  Equations  (17)-(19)  are  still valid,  except  that  (kl  +  k2) 
replaces  kl everywhere,  with k2 given  by n2/Bv,. 
According  to the logic above, a futures  market is therefore  stabiliz- 
ing  and  welfare  improving.  In  this case,  the  addition  of  speculators 
has no informational  effect  at all. Itjust  raises the number of perfectly 
informed  participants  in the  market.  Consequently,  we are left  with 
only  the  beneficial  effect  of  pure  risk  sharing.  As  the  number  of 
secondary  traders  gets  very  large,  all  instability  due  to A  and  X  is 
arbitraged  away, and we approach  a point  where  var(P2  -  PI)  =  vy. 
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permanent  shock  fully  but  reflects  only  half  of  the  transient  shock. 
This  corresponds  to an inventory  scheme  in which  half  of  any tran- 
sient  supply  shock  is  stored  until  the  next  period  but  permanent 
shocks have no effect  on  storage  decisions. 
B.  Secondary  Traders  Have No Information on A 
We  now  consider  the  case  in  which  secondary  traders,  having  no 
private information,  must  rely solely  on  market prices to make their 
judgments  concerning  A  and  X.  Clearly,  this  one  source  of  data  is 
insufficient  to allow them to disentangle  the two shocks perfectly.  The 
best that they can do in formulating  their inventory  demands  is to use 
an optimal  statistical predictor  of  the  form'3 
E(P2  -  -1P=  P  cov[(P2  -  P1),  PI] 
var(P1) 
(otA +  13X)[-ot(2ot  +  2)Va  -  13(213  +  I)v,]  (20) 
(X2Va  +  13p2V 
Since spot  traders  know strictly more  than secondary  traders,  they 
can  deduce  the  secondary  traders'  inventory  demand  exactly.  (This 
just  reflects  the  property  of  the  law  of  iterated  expectations  that 
E1E2P2  =  E2P2,  given  the  current  setup.)  Since  spot  traders  know 
secondary  trader inventory  demand  as well as the X shock,  they can 
use the  price to infer  the  unobservable  A shock perfectly.  Thus  spot 
traders  are in effect  perfectly  informed,  as in the first scenario. 
In the  absence  of  futures  markets,  the  spot  market  equilibrium  is 
exactly that described  in subsection  A for the perfectly  informed  spot 
traders. Once a futures  market is added,  we need  to find another  REE 
pricing  function.  The  method  of  solution  is the  same  as before,  al- 
though  it becomes  more  complicated  here.  Recall that inventory  de- 
mand  in this case will be given  by 
I  =  kE,(P2  -  PI)  +  k2E2(P2  -  P,).  (21) 
Group  l's  expectation  of  the  price  change  is given  in equation  (15). 
It forms  its expectations  based on  perfect  information  as to A and X. 
Group 2's expectation  of the price change  is given by (20), the optimal 
forecast for someone  who observes  only the current  price. To find the 
REE, plug these expectations  into (21) and set this inventory  demand 
equal  to the  actual inventory  given  by (13). 
13  Note  that  this "regression"  equation  has  no  constant  term  since  we are  working 
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The  solution  to the  problem  is given  by 
ot--  dva  - 
=  ot(I1?ki)  (22) 
Va 
+  (V  f2/le2)  1 +  2k' 
where  the  following  new  variables have been  defined: 
g=  1 +  3k1 +  2k12 +  2k2(1  +  kl), 
d  -  2, 
g 
(1  +  ki  +  k2)(1  +  2k1)  (23) 
e- 
g 
O- -(1  +  ki  +  k2)(1  +  kl) 
In contrast  to  the  previous  example,  we do  not  have  a strictly re- 
duced  form  because  of the endogeneity  of k2. However,  it is possible 
to show that k2 does  not depend  directly on  at  or I3  so that simultaneity 
and existence  problems  are avoided. 14  One thing that k2 does depend 
on  is kl.  The  introduction  of  more  spot  traders  makes  it easier  for 
secondary  traders  to make  inferences  from  the  price,  thus  lowering 
V2(P2) and raising k2. (See the  Appendix  for a demonstration  of  this 
fact.) 
With respect  to price variability, it can be shown  that an increase in 
the  number  of  either  type  of  trader  is stabilizing  as well  as welfare 
improving  for both  consumers  and society as a whole.  If we think of 
increasing  the number  of spot traders, this is an expected  result: these 
traders not only provide  risk sharing  but also impart a positive  infor- 
mational  externality  to secondary  traders by making PI  a better  pre- 
dictor  of P2. 
It is perhaps  slightly  more  surprising  that increases  in the number 
of uninformed  traders are also beneficial  since such increases in some 
sense lower the "average informedness"  of market participants.  How- 
ever,  this is mitigated  by two factors:  (1) the increase  in risk sharing 
and  (2)  the  fact  that  spot  traders  know  all the  actions  of  the  unin- 
formed  secondary  traders and so will tend  to offset  any mistakes they 
make.  What  matters  is  not  average  informedness  but  rather  total 
inventory  demand  functions.  The  introduction  of the secondary  trad- 
ers does not affect  the quality of information  held by the spot traders, 
and hence  the spot traders' inventory  demand  function  is unchanged. 
'4  McCafferty and Driskill (1980)  note the potential  for nonexistence  of equilibrium 
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Adding  the  secondary  traders  thus  makes  the  aggregate  inventory 
demand  function  more  elastic, which leads to price stability. The  key 
to this reasoning  lies in the fact that uninformed  traders do not inflict 
any negative  informational  externality  on the informed  traders: spot 
traders retain perfect  information  throughout.  When this feature  dis- 
appears  from  the  model,  as it will under  the  more  general  informa- 
tion structure  of  subsection  C, our  conclusions  can be reversed. 
C.  Secondary  Traders Observe  Noisy Signal of A 
Here  we  will examine  the  intermediate  case  in  which  vw is neither 
zero nor infinite.  In many ways, this case is more general  and realistic 
than the first two. People  often  have access to some information  other 
than  what  they  can  glean  from  prices.  At  the  same  time,  it  is un- 
reasonable  to assume  that when  they set out to learn something  about 
an aggregate  economic  disturbance  they can do a perfect job.  First of 
all, people  may make errors of judgment  in interpreting  news, statis- 
tics, and the like. While such errors might  tend  to "wash out" if every 
trader in a large  group  did  his own  research  separately,  this will not 
be true if large subgroups  of traders get their information  from com- 
mon  sources-if,  for  example,  a  significant  number  of  traders  all 
listen to E. F. Hutton  or another  big investment  adviser. Second,  even 
if  people  did  do  research  independently,  some  components  of  the 
aggregate  A shock  may simply  be impossible  to uncover  directly.'5 
Even with the noise  in the secondary  traders' assessment  of A, one 
might  at  first  glance  be  tempted  to  conclude  that  they  must  be  a 
stabilizing influence  in this scenario  if they were in the last. After  all, 
average  informedness  seems  to have  risen.  The  spot traders can ob- 
serve  the  same  X and  PI  as before,  and  the  secondary  traders  are 
better informed  in that they  now have  two channels  of inference,  Pi 
and Z. 
There  are  complications,  however.  Recall  that,  under  the  last 
scenario,  spot traders could  predict  the actions of the secondary  trad- 
ers  perfectly  since  the  secondary  traders'  information  was a subset 
of  their  own.  This  is what enabled  them  to infer A exactly,  given  PI 
and X. 
Now  this breaks  down.  Since  they  do  not  know  the  nature  of  the 
secondary  traders'  measurement  error  W, the  spot  traders  can  no 
longer  perfectly  predict the inventory  behavior of the secondary  trad- 
ers.  Consequently,  the  spot  traders  cannot  extract  A perfectly  from 
15  The  formulation  used here leads to the same type of results as a model in which we 
write A  as  the  sum  of  two  independent  random  variables  and  assume  that  one  is 
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their  knowledge  of  PI  and X. The  REE pricing  function  for PI  will 
now depend  on A, X, and  W so that it is impossible  to infer A exactly 
knowing  only PI  and X. 
This  muddling  of  the  spot  traders'  information  has  two  effects: 
first, it raises their  conditional  variance  on  the  second-period  price, 
VI  (P2), since they are now unsure  about more than the second-period 
transitory  shock  Y. As  a result,  kl  falls,  and  spot  traders  are  more 
reluctant to hold inventories  than before.  This is a destabilizing  effect. 
Second,  for  a given  kl, spot  traders  now  make  "mistakes" in their 
storage  decisions  that  they  did  not  make  before.  Again,  this  is de- 
stabilizing.  Of course,  these  two negative  effects  are mitigated  by the 
risk-sharing benefit  that the incoming  secondary  traders confer.  Still, 
the net effect  may be destabilizing,  as I will now attempt  to show. 
The  addition  of a third  primitive  random  variable (W) to the pric- 
ing function  raises the dimensionality  of the problem to a point where 
direct computation  of the equilibrium  for arbitrary values of n1 and n2 
becomes  an infeasible  task. In order  to skirt this difficulty,  the model 
is specialized  somewhat.  From  now  on  it is assumed  that,  when  the 
secondary  traders enter,  they enter  in very large numbers  so that the 
group  as a whole  behaves  in  a risk-neutral  fashion.  As will become 
clear, this will allow a much  more  compact  treatment  of  the problem 
without  losing  any of  the  basic spirit  of  the  argument.  As a second 
simplification,  the variances of A, X, and W will all be set to unity. This 
is done  solely  for notational  economy  and changes  nothing  essential. 
One  variance  that is not  normalized  in this way is v,, the variance  of 
the  second-period  transitory  shock  Y. For the  purposes  of  the  argu- 
ment,  it will be necessary  to allow v,, as well as nI, to vary. 
With  three  primitive  random  variables,  the  first-period  price  will 
have the  following  functional  form: 
PI  =  otA +  3X +  8W,  (24) 
with (x, ,3, and 8 left undetermined.  This form leads to inventories  and 
price changes  given  by 
I =(o  +  1)A +  (j  +  1)X +  8W,  (25) 
P2  -Pi  =  (2o?  +  2)A  -  (2  + 1)X-  28W-  Y-  (26) 
Since secondary  traders are risk neutral,  it must be that, given their 
information,  the  expected  price  change  is  zero.  This  implies  that 
cov [(P2  -P  1), Z] =  0 as well as that  cov [(P2  -P  1), P I  ] =  0. Given the 
expressions  above  as well  as the  assumptions  of  unit variance,  these 
two requirements  can be written  as 
-(2(x  +  2)  -  28  =  0;  ora  =  -1  -  8,  (27) 
-ot(2ot  +  2)  -  3(21 +  1) -  282=  0.  (28) 1138  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Spot traders, on  the other  hand,  can expect  some  price change  since 
they are not risk neutral.  To compute  their expectation  requires "run- 
ning  a multiple  regression"  on  their  information  of  the  form 
E(P2  -  P1)  =  b1PI +  b2X,  (29) 
with  the  coefficients  b,  and  b2 being  computed  using  the  standard 
results  from  multivariate  statistical theory.  The  algebra  yields  (after 
substitution  for PI  from  [24]) 
E1(P2 -  PI)  =  (oA  +  8W)[-ox(2ot  +  2) -26]  -  (21  +  1)X.  (30) 
at  +  82 
Since we will be focusing  on kl shortly, it is necessary to calculate the 
prediction  error variance VI  (P2) that is crucial in determining  it. This 
variance  is given  by 
482 
V1(P2)  =  +  vV.  (31) 
at2 +  62 
The  interpretation  is straightforward:  when  8  =  0, then  the  ran- 
dom  variable  W does  not  enter  into  the  pricing  function.  In  such  a 
case, A can be inferred  exactly  from P1 and X so that the only source 
of prediction  error is the second-period  transitory shock Y. However, 
when  8 is nonzero,  there  is the "muddling" effect  mentioned  earlier. 
Consequently,  the  prediction  error variance  increases  beyond  its full 
information  value  of  vy. 
We are now almost ready to write down  the remaining  equilibrium 
conditions-those  that correspond  to forcing  inventories  as given  by 
(25) to equal  inventory  demand.  Spot  trader  inventory  demand  will 
be given by ki times the expected  price change  in (30). As for second- 
ary trader demand,  it will not be zero, even  though  their expectation 
of price change  is zero. This is because there are an infinite number of 
secondary  traders so that total demand  can be a nonzero,  finite num- 
ber. For the purposes  of  finding  the equilibrium,  it is enough  simply 
to express  this limiting  demand  as a function  of secondary  trader in- 
formation: 
D2 =  CIPI  +  C2Z =  ((aCl +  C2)A +  (8C1 +  C2)W +  PC1X,  (32) 
where D2 is secondary  trader demand  and C1 and C2 are temporarily 
undetermined  finite  numbers. 
Equating  inventory  demand  to  inventories  results  in  three  equa- 
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Clot  +  C2  +  kloa[-o(2ot 
+  2)  -  282] 
- 
C~~a  +  C2 +  at2 +  82-a+1,  (3 
C18  +  C2  +  kI8[-ot(2ot  +  2)  -  282]  - 
ct2  +  82 
CIP  -  kl(2  +  1) = 1  +  1.  (35) 
These  three  equations,  taken  together  with (27),  (28), and  (31),  give 
us six equations  that together  determine  the six unknowns  ax,  3, 8, C1, 
C2, and kI. No  attempt  is made  here  to solve them  in a fully general 
case,  although  the  Appendix  does  verify  that  an  equilibrium  does 
exist  in  general.  Instead,  an  example  is  constructed  to  show  how 
destabilizing  speculation  can occur. 
An  Example  of  Destabilizing  Speculation 
The  first step  in  the  example  is to  compute  the  equilibrium  in  the 
special  case  in  which  we  ignore  equation  (31)  and  simply  set  ki  to 
zero-an  equilibrium  with only  the  risk-neutral  group  of  secondary 
traders participating.  It is straightforward  to show that in such a case 
5  4  _  1 
6_;  6';  8  =  - 6  (36) 
var(P2  -  PI)  +  vY.  (37) 
As would be expected,  the a  -  1, I  -  -  1/2,  8=  0 ideal is impossible 
even  with  risk-neutral  secondary  traders  since  their  information  is 
imperfect. 
The  next  step  consists  in  choosing  values  of  n1 and  v,  that  will 
illustrate the phenomenon  of destabilization  as clearly as possible.  Let 
us assume that the number of spot traders n1 is "very small"-not  zero 
but arbitrarily close.  Let us further  write the variance of the second- 
period  transitory shock,  v,, as n1/M, where M is some  finite number, 
and assume  that the risk-aversion  coefficient  B is one.  In the absence 
of  a futures  market,  we would  thus be in scenario  A of  this section, 
with kl  =  M. According  to equation  (19), price variability is equal to 
spot var(P2  -  PI)  =  1  2  +  VT  (38) 
(1  +  2M)  2  (8 
If M is relatively large,  the spot market comes very close to being  a 
"perfect" regime:  prices are almost  totally stabilized,  and speculative 
profits are nearly eliminated-the  optimum  situation  from  the point 
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calculations  show  that when  M  '  3, both  welfare  criteria  deem  the 
spot  market  regime  above  to  be  preferable  to  the  all-secondary 
trader regime  of  (36) and  (37). 
What happens  when  a futures  market  is opened?  The  secondary 
traders enter,  and we must now consider  the more complicated  equi- 
librium  concept.  Given  the  assumption  of  a "small" n1 and  vw, the 
following  proposition  applies. 
PROPOSITION  2.  The  equilibrium  with  a  futures  market  is  "very 
close"  to  the  all-secondary  trader  equilibrium  of  (36)  and  (37). 
Specifically,  by choosing  the  appropriately  small value of  nj,  we can 
construct a futures  market equilibrium  that is arbitrarily close to that 
with only  secondary  traders. 
To  prove  the  proposition,  first note  that k,  is always less  than  or 
equal to M. This  implies  that 8 is nonzero  since 8  =  0 can satisfy the 
equilibrium  conditions  only if k,  =  o.  With a nonzero  8, (31) tells us 
that kl can be made  arbitrarily small by picking a small enough  value 
of nj. Since the all-secondary  trader equilibrium-given  by (27), (28), 
(33), (34), and (35)-is  differentiable  about kl  =  0, it must be that, by 
setting kl small enough,  we can come as close to this equilibrium  as we 
wish. 
The  intuition  is that as long as kl is not initially infinite,  spot traders 
do not arbitrage the market perfectly.  Consequently,  secondary  trad- 
ers must enter,  bringing  their information  with them  and causing  W 
to  enter  the  pricing  function  with  nonzero  weight  &. With  ni  and 
v,  both  very  small,  the  introduction  of  any  additional  uncertainty 
(reflected  in the nonzero  8) has a devastating  effect  on kj: it lowers it 
from  a finite value of M almost  to zero.  In this case, the misinforma- 
tion  that accompanies  the  influx  of  the  secondary  traders  drives  the 
small group  of  risk-averse  spot  traders  almost  completely  out  of  the 
market, resulting  in a new equilibrium  that is very close to what would 
obtain  if the  secondary  traders  were  in the  market all alone.'6 
One caveat pertains,  however.  There  is a "discontinuity" in the limit 
as v_ approaches  zero.  While the logic above applies  with both n1 and 
vz small but nonzero,  things  change  if v, equals  zero exactly,  with na 
still positive.  Now  there  can be two equilibria. 
In the absence  of futures  markets,  there  is no uncertainty  as to the 
second-period  price,  so even  with a small nj, k, is infinite and perfect 
stability is achieved.  Consider  what happens  when a futures  market is 
opened.  One  possibility  is that  the  secondary  traders  never  do  any 
trading.  This  situation  is self-sustaining  because,  as long  as they stay 
16 The  spot  traders  do  not  disappear  from  the  point  of  view of  inventory  activity; 
they  still perform  storage.  However,  they  now  take  negligibly  small  unhedged  posi- 
tions,  and  hence  their  private  information  is almost  completely  withdrawn  from  the 
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out,  there  is no  W uncertainty,  so kl remains  infinite  and  prices  are 
perfectly  stable. With perfectly  stable prices, there  is no incentive  for 
secondary  traders to enter.  They  foresee  no opportunities  for profits. 
(With ot =  -1,  3 =  -I/2,  8  =  0, kI  =  c, along with C1 =  C2 =  0-no 
secondary  trader  activity-we  satisfy the  six equations.) 
However,  it  is  also  possible  to  have  an  equilibrium  in  which  the 
secondary  traders  are active.  In such  a case,  there  is uncertainty  for 
the spot traders,  so kl falls to almost zero. Consequently,  spot traders 
alone  no longer  stabilize prices  perfectly,  thereby  creating  profit op- 
portunities  that justify  the  participation  of  the secondary  traders. 
Of  these  two  equilibria,  only  the  latter  is a limit of  the  equilibria 
where vy  is small but nonzero.  As soon as we make v, a tiny bit positive, 
the  spot  traders  do  not  perfectly  stabilize  the  market  by themselves 
because  of  the  residual  risk they  face.  As a result,  secondary  traders 
will always see  some  profit  opportunities  when  a futures  market  is 
opened  and  will always trade  actively.  The  other  equilibrium  arises 
only because  of  the  discontinuity  in kl that occurs  when  v,  =  0, and 
there  are no other  sources  of  uncertainty;  ki jumps  to infinity  then. 
One  interesting  aspect  of  the  "misinformation  effect"  described 
above  is that  it suggests  that  secondary  traders  as a group  may  be 
made  better  off  with worse  information.  This  cannot  strictly be seen 
in  the  numerical  example  above  because  the  risk  neutrality  of  the 
secondary  traders  forced  their  profits to zero.  But let us suppose  in- 
stead that they are not quite risk neutral  and that we are in the vy =  0 
situation  described  above. 
If  the  secondary  traders  could  observe  A  perfectly,  we  would  be 
back to the  results  of  subsection  A. The  only  possible  equilibrium  is 
one  of  perfectly  stable  prices,  with  nobody  making  any  profits.  If, 
however,  the  secondary  traders  have  a noisy  observation  of  A, they 
can  bring  about  the  destabilizing  equilibrium,  in  which  they  earn 
some  profits  (as long  as they  are not  totally risk neutral).  The  worse 
information  makes them  better off  because  there is a benefit  to being 
unpredictable.  If  spot  traders  can  predict  exactly  what  secondary 
traders  will  do,  the  market  is  riskless  to  the  spot  traders  and  they 
arbitrage away any potential  profits. If, on the other hand, the actions 
of  the secondary  traders  are unpredictable,  the increased  risk makes 
the risk-averse spot traders back out of the market somewhat,  leaving 
behind  imperfectly  stabilized  prices and the accompanying  profit op- 
portunities. 
IV.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
In addition  to providing  increased  risk sharing,  new speculators  also 
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they  operate.  In  general,  informational  externalities  can  be  either 
positive or negative:  the price can become  more or less informative  to 
those  traders already  in the market.  When  the externality  is negative 
and strong  in magnitude  relative  to the need  for increased  risk shar- 
ing  (as it was  in  the  specially  constructed  example  in  the  previous 
section),  the  overall  effect  can be one  of  destabilization  and  welfare 
reduction. 
The  model  has  not  relied  on  any  irrationality  on  the  part  of 
speculators  but rather  on  imperfections  in their information.  This  is 
not  an  unreasonable  approach,  particularly  in light  of  the  fact  that 
imperfectly  informed  speculators  as  a  group  may  do  as well  as or 
better  than  perfectly  informed  ones.  It  is  not  necessarily  true  that 
imperfectly  informed  speculators  will lose  money  to better informed 
ones  and  thus be driven  out  of  business. 
From the point of view of social welfare,  one  might say that "a little 
information  is a dangerous  thing." With extreme  values of vw, corre- 
sponding  to either  perfectly  informed  secondary  traders (vw =  0) or 
completely  uninformed  secondary  traders  (vw  =  oc), there  are  no 
informational  externalities.  It is only in the intermediate  range,  with 
partially  informed  secondary  traders,  that  problems  can  arise.  The 
following  unproven  conjecture  is offered:  of all possible values of vw, 
the one  that minimizes  social welfare  will be approximately  the same 
in  magnitude  as va.  If  vw is tiny  relative  to  va,  the  noise  cannot  do 
much  damage,  no  matter  how  much  weight  traders  put on Z. If, on 
the other hand,  vw is huge  compared  to va, optimizing  traders will put 
a very  small weight  on  their  imprecise  datum  Z, so  again  the  noise 
does  little harm. 
The  notion  that prices aggregate  heterogeneous  information  is cer- 
tainly not a new one.  However,  previous  models  of this phenomenon 
have not usually concerned  themselves  with the question  of intertem- 
poral price stability. Conversely,  papers  addressing  the price stability 
and welfare  effects  of speculation  have for the most part failed to pay 
sufficient  attention  to the informational  aspects of speculative  activity. 
This  paper  has  attempted  to  bring  together  the  techniques  and  in- 
sights of both  strands  of  literature  in order  to suggest  that both risk- 
sharing  considerations  and  potentially  adverse  informational  exter- 
nalities must be taken into account when attempting  to weigh the pros 
and cons of opening  futures  or options  markets or of other  measures 
designed  to facilitate  speculative  behavior. 
Appendix 
1. Derivation  of (2) and (3) 
Consumers maximize equation (1) subject  to the budget constraint  N =  T - 
(PICI + P2C2),  where T is total endowment in terms of the numeraire good INFORMATIONAL  EXTERNALITIES  1143 
(i.e.,  giving  up  one  unit  of  C1 allows them  to consume  PI  more  units  of N). 
The  first-order  conditions  lead  to the  demand  curves  in the  text.  Note  that 
these  demands  are  independent  of  wealth  or of  the  correlation  between  PI 
and P2. 
2.  Derivation of (6) 
Each inventory  holder  seeks to maximize  -  e  which,  given the normality 
assumptions,  is equivalent  to maximizing  E(H)  -(B/2)var(Fl).  End-of-period 
profit is given  by H  =  I(P2  -  P1). Thus  the  problem  is 
max  I(EIP2  -  P1)  -  BI2V1(P2). 
2 
The  first-order  condition  is I  =  (E1P2 -  P1)/[BV1(P2)].  Multiplying  this in- 
ventory  demand  by ni,  the  number  of  inventory  holders,  yields the result in 
the text.  The  derivation  of  (8) follows  exactly  the same  logic. 
3.  Derivation of (7) 
With futures  trading,  spot  trader  profit  is now  given  by H  =  I(P2  -  P1)  + 
F1  (P2 -  Pf). There  is an additional  source of potential  gains to the extent  that 
the price next period  exceeds  the futures  price locked in today. The  problem 
is thus 
maxI(EIP2  -  P1)  +  F1(P2  -  P1)-  +  B(I  +  FI)2VI(P2). 
The  first-order  conditions  with respect  to F1 yield  the  result in the  text. 
4.  Proof That Welfare Is Increasing in k,  in Section IIIA 
Speculative  profits  H  =  I(P2  -P1)  =  [k1X/(1  +  2k,)]  {-Y  +  [X/(1  +  2k,)]}. 
So expected  profits equal EH  =  vxkl/(l  +  2k1)2. Substituting  into (9), we find 
that consumer  welfare  is given  by 
UC  -vy  vX(1 +  2k2  +  4kI) 
2  2  +  8k2 +  8ki 
which  is monotonically  increasing  in ki. 
To  look  at social welfare,  we need  to compute  the  expectation  of  the risk 
aversion term (-B/2n,)V  (Hfl) in equation  (11). This term can be rewritten as 
(-B/2nl)I2V1(P2),  which  has expectation  equal  to  -vxkl/[2(1  +  kl)2].  Sub- 
stituting  into  (11),  we find  that social welfare  is given  by 
s=  _V  -  v  _  vX(1  +  2k2  +  3k1) 
2  2  + 8k2  +  8k, 
which  is monotonically  increasing  in ki. 
Similar arguments  apply  for  the  welfare  assertions  in Section  IIIB. 
5.  Proof That Prediction Error Variance  Is Independent  of ox,  ,B  in Section III B 
Using  the  formulas  in  the  text,  we  find  that  the  prediction  error  P)  - 
E (P2/P  1) is found  to be 
A [-(2ot  +  2)  +  (2(  +  2)Va +  pot(2p  +  I)v, 
+  X-(2P  +  1) +  Pot(2ot +  2)v,  +  ,2(2p  +  1),1, 
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1  n1/Vy 
B 
A~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
6  =  -1/6 
B 
Fi;(.  Al.  Existence  of  equilibrium  in  Sec.  IIIC 
In  subsection  B,  we  had  13  =  Ku,  with  K  =  (1  +  k0)/(l  +  2ki).  This 
simplifies  the  prediction  error  to 
Av,(-2K2  +  K)  Xv,(-1  +  2K) 
Va  +  K2VX  v+  ,  +  KX 
which  is independent  of  (x. It does,  however,  depend  on  K, which  in  turn 
depends  on  the  number  of  informed  traders  in  the  market.  So  we  have  a 
recursive  structure:  k,  determines  k2 through  the  variance  V9(P2) (which, 
from the expression  above, can be shown to be decreasing  in kl). Then  k, and 
kg determine  ax  and  P. 
6.  Proof That an Equilibrium  Exists in Section IIIC 
Let  us  break  our  six-equation  system  down  into  two  parts:  The  first  part 
consists of the five equations  (27), (28), and (33)-(35),  a system where we can 
solve  for  ax, P3,  and  8, taking  k, as exogenous.  It is straightforward  to verify 
that this system has a unique  solution  for each value of kI. Denote  the locus of 
6's and ki's that satisfy the five equations  by AA. Along  AA, 8 is a continuous, 
monotonic  function  of k1, moving  from a value of  -  o6  when kI =  0 to a value 
of  zero  when  kl  =  x. 
The  second  part of the system consists of the equation  that endogenizes  k, 
as a function  of  6-(31).  (It is this endogeneity  of  prediction  error  variance 
that caused existence  problems  in McCafferty and Driskill [ 1980].) Denote  the 
locus  of  6's and  kid's  that satisfy  (31)  by BB.  Along  BB, kI is continuous  in 8, 
moving  monotonically  downward  from  its maximum  value of nl/vz at 8  =  0. 
Given these  facts, it must be that the loci AA and BB intersect,  as figure  Al 
illustrates.  Hence  an equilibrium  exists. INFORMATIONAL  EXTERNALITIES  1145 
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